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In July 2015, dozens of Taiwanese high school students broke into the office of the 
Ministry of Education. The issue at hand was the newly-released high school curriculum 
guidelines for social studies and language arts, the most controversial being the guidelines for the 
teaching of Taiwanese history. While supporters argued that the new guidelines would improve 
word choice and enrich the contents,1 opponents accused the administration for the non-
transparent manner of the revision process as well as what they saw as an attempt by the ruling 
party to whitewash its nearly four-decade-long dictatorship.2 
Three months after the protests in Taiwan, South Korea’s Ministry of Education 
announced that starting from 2017, the production of all middle and high school history 
textbooks would be put under government control.3 This dictum sparked an equally divisive 
response from the Korean public. Supporters asserted that the new textbook would correct 
factual errors and ideological biases, while critics feared that it would airbrush the Japanese 
occupation and the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee, the father of the current president.4 
 The events in Taiwan and South Korea (hereafter referred to as “Korea”) share striking 
similarities. For one, both societies are acrimoniously split over this issue, with no clear majority 
                                                          
1 In 2014, Taiwan’s Ministry of Education rolled out its 12-Year Compulsory Education System, which extended 
compulsory education from nine to twelve years, making senior high school mandatory in addition to elementary 
and junior high school. In preparation for the new system, the Ministry of Education instructed the National 
Academy for Educational Research to evaluate the high school course guidelines. The Ministry calls the resultant 
changes “a fine-tuning of the course guidelines.” See the Ministry’s official press release here: See “Putong gaoji 
zhongxue guowen yu shehui lingyu kecheng gangyao weitiao zhi shuoming,” Ministry of Education, January 27, 
2014.  
2 Abraham Gerber, “Curriculum protests: Group demands release of students,” Taipei Times, July 25, 2015, 
accessed Oct 15, 2015, http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/07/25/2003623834. 
3 “Olbareun yeoksagwan hwakribeul wihan gyogwaseoreul mandeulgessseupnida,” Ministry of Education, October 
28, 2015, http://www.moe.go.kr/web/106888/ko/board/view.do?bbsId=339&boardSeq=60915&mode=view. 
4 Steven Borowiec, “A High School Heroine Has South Koreans Fighting over History Textbooks,” LA Times, 




for or against the changes in history education.5,6,7  This division is a result of the two countries’ 
democratization, which has led to the formation of a “conservative camp” and a “liberal camp.” 
Conservatives in this context do not correspond to fiscal and social conservatives in the U.S.; 
they represent those who see their camp as having led the country through decades of strong 
economic growth despite (or even owing to) their heavyhanded tactics. Liberals, on the other 
hand, led or participated in pro-democracy movements, and see themselves as safeguards of 
democracy against their opponents’ autocratic impulses. Thus, conservatives, tend to whitewash 
their predecessors’ authoritarian legacies, whereas liberals tend to glorify the democratic 
struggle. The two countries’ history textbook wars must be seen in light of this rivalry.  
While the conservatives enjoyed a monopoly over history education in the past, it is 
liberals, now, lead in the competition over the minds of the youth.8 In Korea, those currently 40 
years of age or younger are wary of the right’s dictatorial track record and its preference for 
                                                          
5 According to a survey by Gallup Poll of 1004 Koreans, 36% of those surveyed support the proposed 
nationalization of the textbooks while 53% oppose them. See “Gyogwaseo gukjeonghwa, han-ir jeongsang 
hoedam, 4-daegang sa’eop 교과서 국정화, 한일 정상회담, 4 대강 사업 [Nationalization of Textbooks, Korea-
Japan summit, Four-Rivers Project]” Gallup Korea, November 5, 2015, accessed Dec 15, 2015, 
http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=700. 
6 According to a poll conducted by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of over 900 individuals in 
Taiwan, about 40% of respondents believe that it is not necessary to revise the high school curriculum guidelines 
while 23.7% believe there it is. See “Mindiao chaoguo liucheng minzhong fandui jiaoyu buzhang tigao minjindaig: 
jiaoyubu ying chegao bing chehui kegang,” Democratic Progressive Party, July 30, 2015, 
http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?kw=&m1=11&y1=2015&menu_sn=&sub_menu=43&show_title=%E6%
96%B0%E8%81%9E&one_page=10&page=37&start_p=31&act=&sn=8057.  
7 In the absence of a reliable third-party poll, I chose to cite the poll conducted by the opposition party. While the 
incumbent Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) conducted a poll of over 800 individuals, it asked respondents how 
they felt about the actions of the students but not how they viewed the curriculum guidelines. The party’s caucus 
secretary admitted that more research is necessary to understand public opinion of the curriculum changes 
themselves. See “Xuesheng baowei jiaoyubu mindiao guoban buzhichi,” Central News Agency, August 3, 2015, 
http://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/201508030152-1.aspx.  
8 In Taiwan, history textbook production was privatized in 1999. In Korea, the privatization of history textbook 
production began in 2003 with contemporary Korean history textbooks. Privatization expanded to textbooks 
covering the entirety of Korean history in 2011, when contemporary history was merged with national history into 
one textbook, Korean history.  See Alisa Jones, “Toward Pluralism? The Politics of History Textbooks in South 
Korea, Taiwan, and China,” in History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories, ed. Gi-wook Shin et al. 
(London: Routledge, 2011). 
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stability over reform, having grown up in a time of relative stability and political freedom.9 In 
Taiwan, the conservatives, who project an ethnic Sino-centric national identity, are largely 
perceived as being out of touch with the youth, who instead embrace a civic Taiwan-centric 
national identity.10 It is thus not surprising that recent attempts by conservatives to revise 
textbooks have riled youth in both countries.11, 12   
 This paper seeks to how liberals’ political views affect their views of the past. The focus 
will be on high school history textbooks, as they have been the subject of recent controversies 
and serve as one of the most direct means to understand what views of the past liberals hope to 
transmit to future generations. A previous study by Michael Hsiao examined the differences 
between liberal textbooks’ portrayals of their respective Japanese colonial periods.13 This study 
is therefore a sort of follow-up in that it examines the era after the Japanese left, focusing 
specifically on post-war economic trajectories. However, in contrast to the Hsiao study, which 
argues that differences in the two countries’ textbooks shed light on how national history has 
been re-conceptualized, this paper contends that it is too early to characterize liberal narratives of 
history as “national history.” Thus, the respective history textbook narratives will be analyzed 
                                                          
9 Sook-Jong Lee, “The Rise of Korean Youth as a Political Force: Implications for the U.S.-Korea Alliance,” in 
Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2003-2004, ed. Richard C. Bush et al. (Washington, D.C., Center for Northeast 
Asian Policy Studies, 2004). 
10 “Taiwan minxin dongtai diaocha, daxuan yu zhengjian bianlun,” Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, December 
14, 2015, accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.tisr.com.tw/?p=6225. 
11 Gallup Korea found that support for the recent textbook policy declined with age, with over 80% of respondents 
in their twenties disapproving of the textbook nationalization. (Gallup Korea, Nov 5, 2015) College students have 
also mobilized in protest of the new policy. See Kim Hye-won, “Police power silences students’ opposition against 
president Park’s visit,” Ewha Voice, November 16, 2015, Accessed December 15, 2015. 
http://evoice.ewha.ac.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=4613. 
12 Michael Gold, “Taiwan students end textbook protest as typhoon approaches,” Reuters, August 6, 2015, 
accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/06/us-taiwan-education-protest-
idUSKCN0QB1VH20150806.  
13 Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, “One colonialism, two memories: Representing Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and 




primarily through the histories of liberalism in the two countries and only secondarily through 
the forms of nationalism they entail.   
As demonstrated by the diverse range of comparative studies on the two countries, their 
post-war histories are very similar.14 Japanese colonial rule had bequeathed to both societies 
various benefits—however unintended—that remained intact after the Second World War: 
literacy rates above 20%, modern infrastructure, effective agricultural practices, and a partially 
industrialized economy. After the war, reconstruction efforts in both countries were set back by 
the departure of Japanese capitalists and military conflicts with Communist rivals: the Korean 
War and the Chinese Civil War.15, 16 The Korean War (and Communist China’s involvement) 
sealed the fates of Taiwan and Korea to decades of American involvement. Fears of communism 
convinced the United States of the need to prop up the two countries as Free World allies. 
Finally, both countries achieved economic “miracles” by relying not on natural resources, but on 
strong developmental states; foreign economic aid, trade, and investment; abundant supplies of 
cheap labor; among other things. Therefore, one would assume that the textbooks portray the two 
countries’ economic trajectories in similar fashions. 
To test this hypothesis, I analyzed how the textbooks depicted various factors of 
economic development and have presented below my findings on portrayals of the state, private 
enterprise, the people, foreign aid, and foreign trade. While portrayals of other factors, such as 
agriculture and foreign investment, were analyzed, they did not yield any insights that were not 
                                                          
14 Tun-jen Cheng, Chu Yun-han, Karl Fields, Leng Tze-Kang, Moon Chung-In, and Shin Gi-wook are monumental 
figures in Taiwanese-Korean comparative studies.  
15 While the reconstruction of South Korea began immediately after liberation, it was interrupted by the Korean 
War (1950-53), which devastated industry and reversed results of many earlier reconstruction efforts.  
16 Likewise, the reconstruction of Taiwan was delayed until after the Chinese Nationalist government retreated to 
Taiwan in 1949 upon losing the Chinese Civil War (1946-50). See Samuel PS Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 
1860-1970 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 103.  
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already covered by the ones presented in this paper. Before launching into this discussion, 
however, it is necessary to introduce the textbooks and the pedagogical attitudes of their authors. 
 
Introducing the Textbooks 
The main analysis in this paper focuses on one Taiwanese history textbook and one Korean 
history textbook, which will be referred to as the “liberal Taiwanese textbook” and the “liberal 
Korean textbook.”17 The textbooks chosen are supported by liberals and criticized by 
conservatives, and thus can be taken to broadly represent the views of liberals in both countries. 
More specifically, the Taiwanese textbook follows curriculum guidelines that are considered 
more liberal, and the Korean textbook is published by a more liberal publisher. The main 
difference between the textbook markets of the two countries is that in Korea, the contents of 
textbooks vary depending on the publishing company whereas, in Taiwan, the contents vary 
based on the curriculum guidelines. In Taiwan, the Ministry of Education sets uniform guidelines 
dictating how history textbooks should be written in order to be approved for use. This means 
that Taiwanese textbooks do not vary widely between publishing companies. In Korea, the 
Ministry of Education is also responsible for approving the textbooks and can request publishers 
to revise the textbooks, but does not set guidelines for their contents.18 This means that Korean 
textbooks do differ depending on the publishing company. It is therefore necessary to understand 
                                                          
17 For the purposes of this piece, it made the most sense to refer descriptively to textbooks by referencing their 
country name rather than the name of their publishers, titles, or the authors, as the textbooks are authored by a 
large group of scholars, the titles are extremely similar, and the names of the publishers are not highly 
illuminating.  
18 Sei-yoon Chang, “The Current History Education Curriculum and the System of Textbook Authorization in Korea” 
in History education and reconciliation : comparative perspectives on East Asia, ed Un-suk Han et al. (Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang, 2012), 67. 
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the curriculum guidelines that the Taiwanese textbook adhered to and the company that 
published the Korean textbook.19 
The Taiwanese history textbook is called History: Volume 1 and was published in 2012 
by Sanmin Book Company, one of the major high school Taiwanese history textbook 
publishers.20 Senior high schools in Taiwan consist of three years of study, spanning grades 10 to 
12. Students are required to take four semesters of history class, the first of which is Taiwanese 
history.21 Sanmin’s History: Volume 1 is commonly used during the semester of Taiwanese 
history. This edition follows the 2012 Curriculum Guidelines,22 which largely adhered to the 
guidelines set by the more liberal regimes of Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui.23 Currently, 
textbooks from both the more Taiwan-centric 2012 Guidelines and the more ROC-centric 2015 
                                                          
19 Readers who have are familiar with Michael Hsiao’s study may question my observation that Taiwanese 
textbooks are more homogenous than the Korean. It should be noted that Hsiao’s study analyzes textbooks from 
the early 2000s, whereas mine analyzes those from the early 2010s.  
20 While there is no data on the current market share of each publisher, there are currently nine publishers who 
high school Taiwanese history textbooks have been approved for use, and Sanmin’s is known to be one of the 
major publishers of high school history textbooks in Taiwan. Sanmin’s history textbooks were also used in Hsiao’s 
study on Taiwanese and Korean textbooks. 
21 The rest of the semesters are spent on Chinese and world history. Regular Senior Secondary Schools divide 
students into a “social studies group” and “sciences group” after their first year of study, the former of which can 
elect to study more history in addition to the mandatory four semesters.  
22 Known in Chinese as the 一○一課綱 “101 Curriculum Guidelines” or simply the 舊課綱 “the old curriculum 
guidelines.” 101 here stands for the 101st year of the Republic of China.  
23 History education in Taiwan had been focused on teaching Chinese history, especially after the ROC began losing 
its international standing to the PRC in the 1970s. During the presidency of Lee Teng-hui (1988-2000), high school 
“national history” was divided into “Chinese history” and “Taiwanese history,” making Taiwanese history a 
separate subject for the first time. This was in 1999, so the next set of guidelines would be implemented in 2009. 
In preparation, the Ministry of Education under the pro-independence president Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) 
developed new guidelines, which were released during President Ma Ying-jeou’s term (2008-present). Dissatisfied 
with the 2012 Curriculum Guidelines, pro-unification groups—chief among which the Chinese Integration Society
兩岸統合學會 pushed for more revisions, resulting in the 2015 Curriculum Guidelines, which set off heated 
protests over what critics believed to be a Sinification of the high school subjects of history, civics, and literature. 




Guidelines are in use.24 In response to student protests, roughly half of the public high schools in 
Taiwan announced that they would revert to textbooks from the 2012 Guidelines. 25 The 
Taiwanese textbook used here is thus representative of more liberal views of Taiwanese history. 
The Korean history textbook used is called Korean History and was published by 
Kumsung Publishing in 2013. In Korea, senior high school spans three years. Under the 2011 
Revised School Education Curriculum, high school students are required to take Korean History 
as freshman. As second- and third-year students, they can elect to take East Asian History or 
World History. Kumsung Publishing’s book is currently used by 7.1% of all high schools, 
making it the 4th most commonly used out of eight high school history textbooks.26 These 
numbers however do not do justice to Kumsung’s influence and reputation. Before the 
consolidation of Modern History and National History (which focused on ancient history) into 
Korean History, Kumsung’s Contemporary Korean History was used by the majority of schools 
that offered Modern History courses. Its prominence in the textbook market necessarily attracted 
widespread criticism from conservative groups, who petitioned the Ministry of Education to 
                                                          
24 While views differ even among the ROC and Taiwan camps themselves, their main point of contention is their 
differing definitions of the nation. Proponents of Taiwan-centric historiography see Taiwan as the nation and 
define the “Taiwanese people” as those who live in the current territories of the ROC. They support teaching 
Taiwanese history as its own standalone course and teaching it before teaching Chinese history. Proponents of 
ROC-centric historiography see the ROC as the nation and thus do not believe in separating Taiwanese history into 
its own class, let alone teaching it before Chinese history. Their views are best summarized in this piece by Zhong-
ya Zhang, “yihua de shiguan rentong: cong wozhe dao tazhe,” May 3, 2015, accessed October 15, 2015, 
http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1020/6/2/6/102062669.html?coluid=7&kindid=0&docid=102062669&mdate=051111434
2. 
25 As of August, nearly half of public schools around the country have announced that they would revert to the 
older textbooks. See “yu 5cheng gongli gaozhong lishi xuanyong jiukegang jiaokeshu,” Liberty Times Net, August 
14, 2015, accessed October 15, 2015, http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/906617. 
26 Gim Seongmo, “Jwapyeonhyang gyogwaseo, jeonche hanguksa gyogwaseo maechul 90% doksik,” Chosun Ilbo, 




demand revisions from the publisher.27 Therefore, although it is no longer the market leader, 
Kumsung’s textbook is still useful in understanding how Korean liberals view the past. 
As comparisons with more conservative textbooks help illuminate what makes the liberal 
textbooks liberal, this study will also reference the more recent 2015 edition of Sanmin Book 
Co’s History: Volume I and Kyohaksa Publishing’s 2013 Korean History.  Both textbooks were 
harshly denounced by liberal opponents, so they can be assumed to have conservative 
tendencies.28 The rise of liberalism in both countries has, however, has forced conservatives to 
adopt some liberal platforms to stay relevant. Conservative textbooks now are, therefore, much 
more muted versions of what they were under authoritarian regimes. At times when comparisons 
with modern-day conservative textbooks are insufficient, this paper will also consult studies on 
history education during the post-war period.  
 For reference, here are the table of contents for each liberal textbook, with contents of the 
final chapters expanded: 
Organization of the Korean Textbook 
Unit # Title 
1 The Formation of Our History and the Development of the Ancient Countries 
2 The Formation of and Changes in Goryeo Korean Aristocracy 
3 The Establishment of and Changes in Confucian Society in Joseon Korea 
4 Changes in the International Order and the Movement to Establish a Modern 
Country 
5 Forcible Occupation by the Japanese Empire and the Unfolding of National 
Movements 
                                                          
27 The writers refused, but the publishers made the changes anyways. See Chang, 63.  
28 In fact the Hankyoreh, a liberal paper in Korea established in the aftermath of the 1987 democratic transition, 
has even charged the Ministry of Education’s approval of the textbook, an act of “distorting history.” Korean media 
often levy the same charge against Japanese textbooks. See: “Gyogwaseo yeoksawaegok,” Hankyoreh, March 24, 
2015, accessed October 15, 2015, http://www.hani.co.kr/kisa/section-issue/108/home01.html. For an example in 
which liberal politicians and activists accuse conservatives of “distorting history” in ways “no different than the 
acts of Japan,” see Kim Hee-jin, “TV shows tarnish Gwangju history,” Joongang Daily, May 21, 2013,  accessed 
October 15, 2015, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2971886.  
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6 The Development of the Republic of Korea and Changes in the Modern World 
 
1 Restoration and the Establishment of the Government of the Republic 
of Korea 
2 The Korean War and the Division of the Korean Peninsula 
3 The Growth of Liberal Democracy and the Basic Rights of the People 
4 Economic Development and Sociocultural Changes 
6-4-1 Overcoming Poverty and Achieving Economic Growth 
6-4-2 Modern Social and Cultural Changes 
5 Changes in North Korean Society and Efforts towards Reunification 




Organization of the Taiwanese Textbook* 
Unit # Title 
1 Early Taiwan 
2 Taiwan under Qing Rule 
3 Taiwan under Japanese Rule 
4 Taiwan under the Rule of the Republic of China 
 
9 Politics: From the Onset to the Lifting of Martial Law 
10 Economics: Growth and Challenges 
10-1 The Pioneering of the Taiwan Experience 
10-2 Economic Development and Challenges 
11 Society: Changes and Diversity 
12 Culture: Education and Multiculturalism 
 
*In the Taiwanese textbook, Units 1, 2 and 3 encompass Chapters 1 through 8. 
Most important to this analysis are those chapters that focus on post-war economic growth up to 
the 1980s (italicized and bolded above). They are Chapter 6-4-1, “Overcoming Poverty and 
Achieving Economic Growth,” in the Korean textbook and Chapter 10, “The Pioneering of the 
Taiwan Experience,” in the Taiwanese textbook.  
 
Textbook authors’ pedagogical approaches 
The Korean and Taiwanese textbook authors’ pedagogical approaches are very different. While 
they both fall short of inviting students to think about different perspectives on the past, the 
11 
 
Korean one tries harder to establish its narrative as the truth. In the final paragraph of the 
foreword, the authors write that history education exists “not simply to transmit historical 
knowledge and lessons,” but to allow students to “through a correct understanding of the past, 
correctly understand the present and deal with the uncertain future” (p. 3, emphasis added). The 
original phrase in Korean uses the word olbareuda—which translates to “correct” but verges on 
meaning “morally correct. Olbareuda is often used by Korean scholars and politicians to 
moralistically accuse one another (and the Japanese government) of distorting history.29  
The forceful tone of the liberal Korean textbook’s authors has roots in the militant activist 
nature of Korea’s liberal camp in the 1970s and 1980s. Beginning in the late 1970s, progressive 
scholars criticized their mainstream counterparts for their neutral view of history, arguing that 
history must reflect the needs of contemporary society—democratization and unification—needs, 
which called for revolutionary struggle against the authoritarian anti-North Korea regime.30 
Thousands of university students and intellectuals at this time defied the law to “[plunge] into the 
world of the factory worker, forgoing university diplomas, job prospects, and middle-class lives 
in the hope of bringing about ‘revolution.’”31 Former students of this generation of activist 
scholars remain dominant, giving historical academia the left-nationalist tendencies it has today. 
 Perhaps because they lacked this period of violent struggle, the authors of the Taiwanese 
textbook seem to recognize the existence of different but valid perspectives on history. This 
                                                          
29 That the current conservative administration plans on overhauling the history curriculum also in the name of “a 
correct understanding of history” is no coincidence. See “Olbareun yeoksagwan hwakribeul wihan gyogwaseoreul 
mandeulgessseupnida.” Also note that the webpage on the Ministry of Education’s website dedicated to their new 
history textbook is titled “the correct history textbook”: “Olbareun yeoksa gyogwaseo,” Ministry of Education, 
Accessed December 15, 2015, http://www.moe.go.kr/history/index.jsp. 
30 Hyonku Min, “Trends in the Study of Modern Korean History, 1945∼2000,” International Journal of Korean 
History 5 (Dec. 2003): 17-22.  
31 See the chapter “The Alliance between Labor and Intellectuals” in Namhee Lee, The making of minjung 
democracy and the politics of representation in South Korea (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).  
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understanding is manifested in the foreword, where the reasons for publishing this edition are 
listed:  
to incorporate the latest products of research that have been agreed upon in the 
field of history, to discuss in accordance with historical facts, and to avoid one 
school of thought.32 
That this note on “avoid[ing] one school of thought” (一家之言 yijiazhiyan) is present in both 
the conservative and liberal versions of the textbook demonstrates that the textbook authors 
recognize the importance of viewing the past from more than one perspective. Further, in 
contrast with their Korean counterparts, the Taiwanese textbook authors conclude their foreword 
with an apology for any errors or omissions in the book:  
Due to space limitations, omissions were inevitable. We sincerely ask classroom 
teachers, senior academics, and fellow lovers of history to point out errors so that 
they can be rectified.33 
This author’s note, which is also present in the conservative version of the textbook, shows that 
the authors recognize that their textbooks are not the end all be all. Again, the Taiwanese 
textbooks seems to be more diplomatic than its Korean counterpart.  
This conciliatory attitude among liberal academics today mirrors those of their 
predecessors in 1990s, when for the first time, the Ministry of Education debated plans to make 
history and social studies curricula more Taiwan-centric. At the time proposals for the new 
textbooks worked up a whirlwind of criticism from the conservative camp. Rather than 
dismissing their opponents’ views, however, the reformers chose to compromise. They acceded 
to the notion that “there existed ‘a Chinese perception of Taiwan’ and a ‘Taiwanese perception 
                                                          
32 No page number given. 
33 Also no page number given. 
13 
 
of Taiwan,’” and called for the alteration of certain passages to “respect their sensitivities.” 34 
Some advocates who did not directly part take in the reforms even adopted the “strategy of 
toning down the revolutionary aspect of the new textbooks” to avoid unnecessarily provoking the 
opposition.35  
It should also be noted that, at the time, the winds of change were in favor of 
“Taiwanization” or “nativization” (bentuhua). That the president at the time, Lee Teng-hui, fully 
supported these changes, probably made reformers less desperate. Further, advocates of 
Taiwanization were calling for a new paradigm of nation that included all residents of Taiwan.36 
Thus, while they were still radical for their time, liberals were at least calling for a more 
inclusive nation-based identity, as opposed to their Korean counterparts who privileged class 
over nation.  These factors are most likely what allows liberal Taiwanese academics to be more 
accepting of different perspectives.   
                                                          
34 Stephane Corcuff, “History Textbooks, Identity Politics, and Ethnic Introspection in Taiwan: The June 1997 
Knowing Taiwan Textbooks Controversy and the Questions it Raised on the Various Approaches to ‘Han’ Identity,” 
in History Education and National Identity in East Asia, ed. Edward Vickers et al. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 148. 
35 Ibid, 149. 
36 Jones, 217. 
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The attitudes of the textbook writers can also be seen from the kinds of activities they 
incorporate into the text. The activities are shown below: 
 
The two activities in the chapters on economic growth in the Taiwanese textbook ask 
readers to look at a timeline and explain why GDP dropped during certain years (p. 201) and to 
put the economic policies discussed in the chapter in the context of the history of a famous 
Activities in the Economic Growth Sections of the Liberal Textbooks 
▲ “The Spread and Influence of Neoliberal Economic Policies” – activity in the 
economic growth half-chapter of the Korean textbook 
▲ “Secrets Hidden in the Numbers” – 
activity in Chapter 10-1, “The Pioneering 
of the Taiwan Experience,” from the 
Taiwanese textbook 
▲ “Brand Researcher” – activity in 
Chapter 10-2, “Economic Development 




Taiwanese company (p. 207). These activities ask students to apply what they learned and do not 
ask them to make normative judgements. The activity in the Korean half-chapter, on the other 
hand, asks students to pass judgment—specifically one kind of judgment. The activity includes a 
passage that first explains reasons for neo-liberal economic policies, but quickly turns into a 
tirade on their failings. The paragraph concludes by listing the many countries that have 
witnessed anti-free trade policies, and the accompanying photograph displays anti-WTO 
protesters in the Philippines wielding “JUNK WTO!” signs—a clear indication of the message 
that authors wanted to send (p. 400). Therefore, while the activity asks students to discuss how 
neo-liberal economic policies influence “our everyday lives,” it is obvious that the authors are 
not looking for a balanced response.37 
From this analysis of pedagogical approaches, it is clear that while neither textbook 
invites students to think for themselves, the liberal Korean textbook more aggressively imposes 
its views on the reader. The liberal Taiwanese textbook’s more diplomatic approach to history is 
most likely a product of the less desperate history of liberalism in Taiwan as well as the more 
socially inclusive nature of its ideology. Keeping this difference in mind, the discussion will now 
turn to the textbooks’ portrayals of various factors in the two countries’ post-war economic 
miracles.  
 
                                                          
37 This aversion to neo-liberal economic policies, such as the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, is characteristic of 
the New Left in Korea, whose ideology is rooted in the 1980s minjung movements. In fact, the People’s Solidarity 
for Social Progress (PSSP), a prominent New Left organization, was founded when two groups merged in order to 
“join forces against neoliberal policies in South Korea under the IMF regime and [their] detrimental effects on 
labor and the poor.” See Alice S. Kim, “Left Out: People’s Solidarity for Social Progress and the evolution of minjung 
after authoritarianism,” in South Korean Social Movements – From Democracy to Civil Society, ed. Gi-Wook Shin et 
al. (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
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The contents of the chapters that discuss this topic are shown below for reference: 
Organization of the Post-War Economic Growth Sections  
 Korean Textbook Taiwanese Textbook 
Title of 
Chapter 
Unit 6-Chapter 4  
Economic Development and 
Sociocultural Changes 
Chapter 10 
Economics: Growth and Challenges 
Contents 6-4-1 Overcoming Poverty and 
Achieving Economic Growth 
A. Economic Conditions in the 
1950s and American 
Economic Aid 
B. The Park Administration 
which Began Industrialization 
in Earnest 
C. Features of Park’s Economic 
Development Policies  
D. Korea’s Economic Situation 
Since the 1980s 
10-1 The Pioneering of the Taiwan 
Experience 
A. Economic Recovery after the 
Second World War 
B. Import Substitution Era 
(1950s) 
C. Export Expansion Era (1960s) 
D. The Second Import 
Substitution Era (1970s) 
E. Small- and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises and Economic 
Growth 
 
10-2 Economic Development and 
Challenges 
A. Liberalization and 
Globalization (1980s and 
onwards) 
B. Challenges and Responses 
 
1. The State 
While all states are involved in their economy, heavy state intervention has been an especially 
prominent characteristic of the economies of Taiwan and South Korea since the end of World 
War II. Called the “developmental state” model, this system involves a state that actively 
manages the economy while suppressing political resistance. The developmental state not only 
adopts indirect measures to support the economy, such as investments in infrastructure and 
education, but also directly controls it by setting national economic goals and establishing 
bureaucratic agencies to oversee their implementation, identifying high-potential industries and 
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allocating resources to support them, prioritizing exports and seting up export-processing zones 
to facilitate them, among other measures.38 A former Chief Economist of the World Bank even 
argued that “The real miracle of East Asia may be more political than economic.”39  
How do the liberal textbooks discuss the developmental state? While both textbooks 
provide a systematic treatment of government policies, they also question the results of the 
developmental state—unsurprising given that liberals in both countries oppose the state-centric 
narrative of development advanced by their conservative counterparts. However, the textbooks 
challenge the conservative accounts in different ways.  
Whereas the liberal Korean textbook directly states the negative ramifications of the 
developmental state model, its Taiwanese counterpart takes a much more discreet approach. A 
passage from the Korean textbook is shown below:  
Unlike the developmental policies of advanced capitalist countries, those of the 
Park administration in the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by their reliance 
on state leadership. As the state-managed economic development policies had the 
advantage of being able to produce satisfactory results in a short period of time, 
they have greatly influenced the economic policies of other under-developed 
countries. However, the government’s excessive interference in the economy led 
to such problems as a decline in spontaneous non-governmental economic 
activities and cozy relationships between the government and corporations….  
While foreign capital-driven economic development and export-oriented growth 
policies yielded great results, they came saddled with side effects just as great in 
magnitude. The over-influx of capital came with the hefty responsibility of 
repayment and hindered the stable operation of enterprises. Further, because 
policies focused more on expanding exports than on generating domestic demand, 
Korea became over dependent on the outside world, especially the U.S. and Japan 
(p. 399). 
This portion of text begins by describing state leadership as the defining feature of the 
administration’s policies and praising a merit of state-led economic growth: its ability to get 
                                                          
38 Zhiqun Zhu, Understanding East Asia's economic "miracles" (Ann Arbor, Mich: Association for Asian Studies, 
2009).  
39 Ibid, 68.  
18 
 
results fast. However, the rest of the passage details the many unfortunate consequences of the 
developmental state model and even characterizes government interference as “excessive.” It 
should also be noted that this text is taken from the section entitled “Features of the Economic 
Development Policies under the Park Administration,” which concludes the discussion of 
economic policies. It is thus clear that the textbook authors intended for students to walk away 
questioning the wisdom of the developmental state—and questioning it in a way that textbook 
authors saw fit. The direct criticisms can be interpreted as a refusal to glorify the heavy-handed 
developmental state. 
Nonetheless, the liberal Taiwanese textbook also calls into question the argument that the 
country’s dictatorial government “did it all”—albeit indirectly. A comparison of the new and old 
versions of the textbook show that few changes were made to this chapter, but that the changes 
made predominantly affected portrayals of the state. For one, the newer, more conservative 
textbook omits the italicized section in the following passage—a reference to the financial 
weakness of the ROC government in the 1950s:  
At a time when the government was short on finances and struggling to 
reconstruct facilities damaged during the war, the U.S. also provided much-
needed assistance in repairing and rebuilding infrastructure involving electricity, 
transportation and shipping, and irrigation (“Economic Recovery after the Second 
World War,” p. 195). 
The decision to omit a clause highlighting the state’s inability to rebuild the country on its own 
seems to reveal a desire to project a more dignified image of the state.  
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Further, the conservative textbook adds a nearly page-sized visual (shown below) 
depicting the “Ten Major Construction Projects” (十大建設; shi da jianshe), a national 
infrastructure project the government undertook in the 
1970s. This addition is significant, because in post-war 
Taiwan, the KMT regime used its development of 
Taiwan to legitimize its regime. Until the 1990s, there 
was only one section in history textbooks that discussed 
Taiwan: “The Achievements and Development of the 
Base for Recovery [of the mainland]”—the “base of 
recovery” being what Taiwan was officially called in 
textbooks. Incidentally, this was also the one section that 
was significantly updated from one edition to the next in 
order to impress upon students the state’s latest 
contributions to the island:  
This section focused on the triumphs of the ROC regime in constructing Taiwan’s 
infrastructure; building schools, universities, and hospitals; promoting economic 
development; and generally improving the quality of life for Chinese citizens on 
Taiwan.40  
The Ten Major Constructions Projects would thus have featured largely in textbooks. Its upgrade 
to nearly a full-page visual harkens back to the history textbook narratives during the party-state 
era.  
                                                          
40 Mei-hui Liu et al, “Identity issues in Taiwan’s History Curriculum,” in History Education and National Identity in 
East Asia, ed. Edward Vickers et al. (New York: Routledge, 2005), 110. 
Visual included in the more 
conservative edition of the Taiwanese 
textbook. 
 “Ten Major Construction Projects” 
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Finally, the revision that seems to most directly emphasize the role of the developmental 
state is the inclusion of the following activity called “the Visible Hand,” which asks students to 
fill in rows labeled “what the government did” and “the results”:  
 
The title, “visible hand,” and the description above the chart make it clear that government 
intervention was key to Taiwan’s economic miracle. The description begins by explaining Adam 
Smith’s “the invisible hand” as a theory postulating that an economy will, by dint of free market 
mechanisms, grow without need for government intervention.41 The sentence that follows then 
refutes this explanation: “Nevertheless, from the 1950s to the present, the visible hand of the 
government-formulated policies has propelled Taiwan’s industrial development” (p. 199). This 
                                                          
41 Interestingly, the term, “visible hand,” was actually used by Alfred D. Chandler in 1977 to refer not to the role of 
governments but to those of managers in keeping an economy afloat. It is not clear whether the textbook authors 
appropriated this term for their own purposes or simply thought of it on their own.  
Decade 1950s 1960s 1970s 
Economic 
Period  
Import Sub. Export Exp. 2nd Import 
Sub. 





































 “Visible Hand” Activity in the Conservative Textbook 
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statement seems to imply that Taiwan’s benevolent government was able to disprove a theory of 
a world-renowned economic thinker. After this description that touts the role of the 
developmental state, the activity invites readers to fill in the chart that directly links the country’s 
economic successes to the actions of the government by filling in the chart. Taken together, all of 
these examples—the omitted text, the added visual, and the added activity—signal the authors’ 
intention to play up the role of the state in the newer edition of the textbook, most likely to meet 
more conservative textbook authorization guidelines. Thus, it is clear that the liberal counterpart 
is much less pro-developmental state than its conservative counterpart. This comparison shows 
how the liberal Taiwanese textbook also challenges the conservative state-centric narrative of 
economic development, but does so indirectly. 
Thus, while authors of both liberal textbooks question state-centric narratives, they do so 
in different ways. The liberal Taiwanese textbook subtly downplays the role of the government, 
whereas its Korean counterpart openly broadcasts the negative consequences of government 
decisions. This difference in approaches most likely stems from the Korean textbook authors’ 
desire to once again establish their view as “the proper understanding of history” and the 
Taiwanese textbook authors’ sensitivity to opposing views.  
 
2. Private Enterprise 
Along with the state, private enterprise was essential to the two economies’ meteoric rise. Given 
that liberals in both countries are inclined to play down the role of the state, it would be in their 
interests to tout private sector achievements. This is certainly true of the liberal Taiwanese 
textbook. In Korea, however, liberals face the additional problem of a private sector that 
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depended on the state and, in their eyes, oppressed its workers. Crony capitalism and difficult 
management-labor relations thus makes Korean liberals less enthusiastic about private enterprise 
than they otherwise would be. Therefore, while both liberal textbooks look favorably upon the 
public sector, they do not celebrate them to equal extents. 
The liberal Taiwanese textbook waxes lyrical about the country’s private sector, as 
shown in the passage below:  
In the 1960s and 1970s, SMEs were an important driving force behind the growth 
of exports. As Taiwan relied considerably strongly on foreign trade, export-
oriented SMEs flourished at that time, becoming the engine of Taiwan’s 
economic growth…. SMEs pooled foreign capital, imported machinery, 
technology, raw materials, and semi-finished products, and used Taiwan’s 
abundant supply of cheap labor to mass-export their products to foreign markets, 
mainly the U.S. Electrical machinery, electrical appliances, ready-to-wear 
clothing, and plastics were the most notable industries in this regard. The impact 
of SMEs on economic growth can be seen from the fact that in the mid-1970s, 
SMEs with at most 100 employees employed around 60% of Taiwan’s labor 
supply and until the 1980s, SMEs accounted for two-thirds of total exports (p. 
200). 
This passage highlights the many contributions of small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs)—
the symbol of Taiwan’s private sector—and even calls them the “engine of Taiwan’s economic 
growth.” This highly positive assessment of the private sector is reflected in the fact that the 
textbook dedicates an entire section of the chapter to discussing the role of SMEs: “SMEs and 
Economic Growth.” This appraisal of SMEs seems to be one means to challenge conservative 
narratives that aggrandize the importance of the developmental state. In fact, in the conservative 
2015 edition of this textbook, the section titled “SMEs and Economic Development” is renamed 




The liberal emphasis on private enterprise is also most likely a challenge to the Chinese 
Nationalist Party’s ideological and political preference for a state-controlled economy. From its 
founding in mainland China, the Party advocated strong control over the economy,43 believing 
that, if left to themselves, capitalists would only exploit the people.44 In Taiwan, the Party faced 
an additional problem: it was a minority ruling ethnicity (waishengren) hesitant to share political 
power with the majority ethnicity (benshengren) that dominated the private sector. The fact that 
a possibly hostile ethnic group controlled the private sector naturally “raised concerns among 
political leaders that this economic power could be translated to political power.”45 Hence the 
Party continued to exert heavy influence over the economy: from the 1950s to the 1980s, Taiwan 
“had one of the biggest public enterprise sectors outside the communist bloc and Sub-Saharan 
Africa… In Asia, only India and Burma [were] of the same magnitude”46 Samuel PS Ho and 
                                                          
42 The decision to change the title could also be justified by the fact that the section includes two sub-sections, 
named “Path-breaking SMEs” and “Four Asian Tigers.” Thus, the authors may have simply changed the title to “The 
Taiwan Experience,” because they felt that it more appropriately encompassed its two sub-sections. However, as 
discussed in the Developmental State section of this paper, most of the revisions between the 2013 and 2015 
editions involved aggrandizements of state contributions. Further, the entire textbook was revised to appease a 
more conservative Ministry of Education. Thus, it is highly likely that the decision to remove SMEs from the 
limelight was also way to demonstrate allegiance to historical narratives favored by conservatives. 
43 While the KMT is often thought of as capitalist and the CCP as communist, in reality its economic ideology 
combines elements from both systems. In the 1924 Manifesto of the First National Convention of the Kuomintang, 
Sun Yat-sen argued that “big industries such as banks, railways, and steamship lines which can be favorably 
operated by a monopoly or are of such dimensions as to exceed the power of individual investment, should be 
managed by the state. In this way, the private capitalists can have no power to interfere with the normal economic 
life of the people.”  
44 Journals associated with the nationalists at the time often lambasted the capitalists as selfish and exploitative. 
See Park M. Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937 (Cambridge: Council on 
East Asian Studies, 1980) 263. After consolidating power over China in 1927, the KMT put economic development 
and companies in key sectors under state control. The KMT’s control over the economy only increased after the 
Japanese left China following World War II, leaving behind companies and capital for it to confiscate. As a result, 
the government "controlled 80 per cent of total industrial capital and monopolized the banking system." See Yuwa 
Wei, Comparative Corporate Governance : A Chinese Perspective (Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 88. 
45 Karl Fields, Enterprise and the state in Korea and Taiwan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 86. 
46 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 176. 
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Neil H. Jacoby argue that it was U.S. aid, and thus U.S. pressure, that moved the ROC 
government on Taiwan towards more private sector-friendly policies.47 Therefore, the liberal 
Taiwanese textbook’s emphasis on private enterprise was most likely motivated by a desire to 
challenge the statist narrative of the Chinese Nationalist Party.  
The Taiwanese textbook’s indirect approach to challenging the developmental state 
narrative, however, contrasts with the Korean textbook’s direct approach, evident in the passage 
below (emphasis added): 
The government’s excessive interference in the economy led to such problems as 
a decline in spontaneous non-governmental economic activities and cozy 
relationships between the government and corporations (p. 399). 
The assertion that an overly heavy-handed state suppressed “spontaneous non-governmental 
economic activities,” a vague phrase that most likely refers to smaller-scale private enterprise, is 
certainly not false. Although SMEs had dominated the country’s manufacturing scene until the 
early 1960s, by the mid-1970s they had become overshadowed by large establishments (LEs). 
These enjoyed easier access to credit as well as the support of a government that favored capital-
intensive industries. Thus inhabiting the lowest rung of the industrial food chain, SMEs in the 
1960s and 1970s languished, not to see rebounds in employment and gross production until the 
1980s and 1990s.48  
                                                          
47 Jacoby wrote that, “U.S. aid helped to create a booming private sector of Taiwan’s economy indirectly, by 
inducing favorable Chinese economic policies and by making available increased power, transportation, efficient 
labor, and low-priced raw materials. Unless AID had used its influence actively, the private sector would have 
languished.” See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. aid to Taiwan; a study of foreign aid, self-help, and development (New York: 
F.A. Praeger, 1967), 51. Ho wrote that, “AID… was strongly committed to the growth of the private sector and used 
its influences and resources to improve the climate for private enterprises. Without AID’s influence and active 
intervention, the private sector would not have become Taiwan’s foremost source of economic growth. AID helped 
to create a more conducive atmosphere for economic growth, particularly for the expansion of private industries, 
by (1) financing government projects with strong external economies, (2) inducing the government to liberalize its 
economic policies, and (3) laying a constraining hand on military expenditures. (p. 117)” 
48 Jeffrey B. Nugent et al., “Small and Medium Enterprises in Korea: Achievements, Constraints and Policy Issues,” 
in Asian Entrepreneurship Volume III, Leo Paul Dana, (London: Sage Publications, 2015). 
25 
 
The assessment of the Park administration’s treatment of SMEs as neglectful is thus 
accurate, but what of its assessment of the LEs—the Samsungs and Hyundais that arguably 
thrust the country onto the world stage? Called chaebol, these famous family-owned business 
conglomerates contributed significantly to pulling the country out of poverty and making it 
globally competitive. Despite their important role in the post-war Korean economy, they are 
nowhere to be found in the section that details the Park administration’s economic policies. And 
even when the textbook hints at chaebol, it is in the context of “cozy relations between the 
government and big corporations” (p. 399). The original Korean is jeonggyeong yuchak 
정경유착, a well-known phrase that invokes the image of businessmen colluding with 
government officials behind closed doors, as shown in the following image:
 
Why does the Korean textbook not only fail to discuss the role of the chaebol in the 
country’s economic development, but also dwell on the negative consequences of their 
relationship with the government? Here, a comparison with passages from an equivalent section 
in the conservative textbook, “The Park Administration’s Compressed Development Policies and 
their Successes” is illustrative:  
Jeonggyeong Yuchak Comic 
The man on the right--representing South 
Korea’s most powerful business lobby, the 
Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)--slips 
an envelope under the table to the man on 






The government provided low-interest rate loans to exporting firms. With such 
policies, exports broke US$100 million for the first time in 1964.… In 1973, Park 
announced his Plan for the Cultivation of Heavy Industry and decided to cultivate 
the steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, and chemical 
industries, with the goal of achieving a per capita GNP of US$1,000 and an export 
volume of US$10 billion. This goal was achieved four years early, in 1971…. The 
rapid economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s greatly improved the people’s 
quality of life. However, wealth became concentrated in the chaebol, leading to 
social problems such as a widening wealth gap, which in turn increase the need 
for welfare policies (p. 332). 
While the last sentence laments unfortunate side effects of Park’s chaebol-focused policy, the 
majority of the passage describes how the government helped big business and how successful 
this collaboration was, thus linking strong government-big business relations to economic 
triumph. The liberal textbook authors were most certainly responding to this sort of narrative that 
places not only the government, but also government-backed chaebol, at the heart of Korea’s 
economic success story. In order to show their disapproval of the state, liberals shunned its junior 
partners—the chaebol. 
Korean liberals’ aversion to the state-and-chaebol-centric narrative must also be seen in 
the context of minjung thought, which became central to South Korea’s liberal movements in the 
1970s and 1980s.49 Fundamentally, minjung ideology sees the minjung or the “common people” 
as the main agents in history. To understand what is meant by “common people,” it is useful to 
understand what it is not. The minjung is not “elites and leaders or even the educated or 
cultured”; instead, minjung designates those who were historically oppressed and marginalized 
from traditional institutions of power.50 In the context of capitalist production relations, this 
                                                          
49 The issue of workers’ rights surfaced continuously during the democracy protests. Accounting for nearly 30% of 
all issues raised during protest events in the 1980s, workers’ rights were second only to anti-repression in the 
protest demands. See Gi-Wook Shin et al, “The Korean democracy movement,” in South Korean Social Movements 
– From Democracy to Civil Society, eds. Gi-Wook Shin et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 29-30. 
50 Namhee Lee, “From minjung to simin: The discursive shift in Korean social movements,” in South Korean Social 
Movements – From Democracy to Civil Society, eds. Gi-Wook Shin et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 42.  
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meant blue collar workers, farmers, and the poor. An enemy of the minjung was, therefore, the 
chaebol that, in their eyes, oppressed the workers.51  
While the concept of the minjung has fallen out of favor since the country’s 
democratization, it continues to color liberal thinking to this day. For instance, a prominent labor 
activist argued in 2006 that the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement would only benefit the state 
and the conglomerates, implying that it would not benefit the “common people”: 
There is no benefit to workers and minjung in the ruling class strategy of relying 
on and supporting the minority of chaebols through financial expansion, rather 
than expanding growth in production or employment, trying to insert itself in the 
world economy that is only postponing capital crises.52 
The legacy of minjung thought is thus an important reason why the liberal Korean textbook 
authors did not see fit to depict the chaebol as symbols of their country’s private sector. In sum, 
Korean liberals detest the chaebol for their cozy relationships with the state and also for their 
oppression of the minjung. These factors give Korean liberals an ambivalence towards private 
enterprise that their Taiwanese counterparts do not have. 
This divergence in the two forms of liberalism stems from divergent government policies 
towards the private sector that would result in differences in labor-management relations. Karl 
Fields provides an illustrative metaphor of the how government-big business relations differed in 
the two countries: whereas in Taiwan “local capitalists and government officials have coexisted 
in a relationship of commensalism, that is, living together but with largely independent roles,” in 
Korea, they have enjoyed “a relationship of symbiosis, or living together and acting as an 
                                                          
51 Secondly, minjung it is not the standard term for “the people”; that would be gukmin or literally “national 
people.” Subscribers to minjung thought thus harbored a certain disdain towards the “military dictatorship, 
corporate conglomerates, and foreign powers,” which had, in their eyes, betrayed the “common people” in the 
name of the nation. Ibid, 42. 
52 Ryu Mi-gyung, KORUS-FTA: Already a Failed Future, quoted in Alice S. Kim, “Left Out.” 
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integral unit.”53 Thus, whereas the ROC government did not support (and at times even limited) 
growth of the country's private enterprises, the Korean government took the opposite approach: it 
offered generous financial incentives to leading companies, causing capital to become 
concentrated in the hands of a few conglomerates. Further, the government responded to the 
shock of the 1973 oil crisis by promoting capital-intensive heavy-and-chemical industries. It thus 
concentrated even more wealth in the chaebol.54 
The government’s decision to focus on large firms in select regions inadvertently 
exacerbated life for the working class and helped incubate a working class identity. Firstly, as 
factories in Korea were concentrated in the Seoul-Incheon and Busan-Masan regions, Korean 
workers had to uproot themselves entirely from their homes in the countryside. Thus, in contrast 
to their Taiwanese counterparts who could fall back on agricultural work in their hometowns 
nearby, Korean workers had no such recourse. Secondly, the concentration of workers also 
afforded Korean laborers more opportunities to meet one another, facilitating the development of 
class consciousness. In Taiwan, on the other hand, the scattered nature of factories hampered the 
formation of a working class identity. Thirdly, Taiwanese workers often saw their jobs at small- 
and medium-sized factories as launch pads to future entrepreneurial careers, whereas the 
gargantuan nature of Korean factories precluded their workers from harboring such fantasies. As 
Yin-Wah Chu writes, “[w]ith neither the buffer of the agricultural economy nor the prospect of 
opening their own business, workers in South Korea have been more likely to appreciate 
collective action and realistic option to better their life chances.” 55 Thus, although it is not 
                                                          
53 Fields, 68. 
54 Yin-Wah Chu, “Labor and Democratization in South Korea and Taiwan,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 28. 2 (Jan 
1, 1998): 190. 
55  Ibid. 
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known if Taiwanese enterprises were less exploitative, it is the case that Korean workers were 
more likely to mobilize against their large employers and the authoritarian state that backed 
them. The more vocal nature of the Korean working class as well as its already antagonistic 
relations vis-a-vis the state ensured that the minjung would become central to the Korean 
democracy movement and remain relevant to the Korean left today. 
 Therefore, the difference in how the liberal textbooks in the two countries depict the role 
of private enterprise results from the divergent needs of liberalism. In Taiwan, the liberal 
textbook highlighted the role of private enterprise as a counterbalance to the conservative state-
centric narrative. In Korea, however, minjung liberals’ detest for the oppressive chaebols, and 
their crony capitalism, dampened textbook writers enthusiasm for the private sector.  
 
3. The People 
Times of economic hardship often motivate states to mobilize their people by appealing to their 
sense of patriotism. During the Second World War, for instance, American propaganda posters 
featured Rosie the Riveter, who left her comfortable home to serve her country in factories. In a 
similar vein, for much of the postwar period, the governments of South Korea and Taiwan 
actively impressed upon their citizens the need to make personal sacrifices for the economic 
wellbeing of their nation. This policy thus necessitated accompanying policies to foster in youth 
a love of their country, an objective that influenced how history was taught.  
 In the past few decades however, the relaxing of Cold War tensions, shifts in pedagogical 
goals, and the growth of diverse civil societies in both countries have made history curricula 
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today much less dogmatic.56 In all four textbooks analyzed, there are no portrayals of citizens 
patriotically serving their country in the work force. By contrast, the textbooks do depict them as 
active agents in social movements, reflecting the dramatic shift in political priorities since 
democratization.57  
Nevertheless, the textbooks’ lack of concern for the agency of the “normal people” in the 
economy does not mean that they portray them in the same way. Whereas the Taiwanese 
textbook focuses on official policies and their macroeconomic effects, the Korean textbook, most 
likely influenced by the minjung focus on the “common people,” also shows how 
macroeconomics filtered down to lower social strata. This means that the Taiwanese textbook 
considers people insofar as they relate to the economic policies and industries under discussion, 
whereas the Korean textbook focuses more on discussing how economic conditions shaped the 
lives of average people. This difference is clear from the titles of the chapter/half-chapter and the 
section headings. The title of the chapter Taiwanese textbook, for instance, is “The Pioneering of 
the Taiwan Experience,” which foreshadows the chapter’s focus on the government and private 
enterprise—those actors responsible for “pioneering” the Taiwan Miracle. On the other hand, the 
half-chapter in the Korean textbook is titled “Overcoming Poverty and Achieving Economic 
Growth,” demonstrating a prioritization of the people’s lives (“overcoming poverty”) over 
economic results (“economic growth”). 
In addition, the difference in the two textbooks’ foci can be seen from their charts and 
pictures. Whereas the main chart in the Korean discussion of this topic is a large timeline that 
                                                          
56 Jones, “Toward Pluralism? The Politics of History Textbooks in South Korea, Taiwan, and China.”  
57 In each textbook, preceding the economic development chapter/half-chapter is a chapter/half-chapter on 
democratization and social movements. In the Korean textbook, it is called “The Growth of Liberal Democracy and 
the Basic Rights of the People and in Taiwan it is called “Politics: From the Onset to the Lifting of Martial Law.” It 
should be noted that the conservative textbooks also discuss political changes before economic changes.  
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tracks GDP per capita, the main chart in the Taiwanese textbook correlates changes in economic 
growth rates to government policies and changes in external economic conditions. In South Korea, 
the rise in GDP per capita has become a symbol of the country’s economic miracle. That the main 
chart in this section displays improvements in GDP per capita most likely speaks to the authors’ 






                                                          
58 In the Korean textbook we used in Korea University, GDP per capita was one of the phrases we learned in the 
“Industrialization and Democratization” unit. It was included along with other phrases that were usually used in 




 The textbooks’ different agenda are also clear from the pictures used in the textbooks. 
While both textbooks show images of impressive industrial complexes and highways—symbols 
of economic growth—their images differ when they involve the “common people.” The first and 
last sections of the half-chapter on this topic in the Korean textbook include photographs of 
impoverished urbanites, whereas the Taiwanese textbook shows pictures of people in the context 
of economic policies. All the average Taiwanese portrayed are factory workers.  
Top: Chart in Korean textbook that tracks changes in GDP per capita and the country’s main export 
products from the 1950s to 2000s. Bottom: Chart in Taiwanese textbook that correlates changes in 
economic growth rates from the 1952 to 2010 to government policies (color-coded pink, orange, green, 
and blue) and changes in external economic conditions (the red text). The rounded purple box in the 
lower left says “American Aid Stabilizing the Economy” 





While images from both textbooks portray average people in the context of economic forces 
beyond their control, the Korean textbook’s images of the urban poor are more likely to solicit 
compassion whereas the Taiwanese textbook’s images of factory workers being supervised are 
Left: A man wearing a sign that says “Looking 
for a job.” Caption explains low GDP per 
capita in the 1950s. Below: Homeless people 
during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. These 
images highlight the suffering of the lower 
classes during times of economic hardship.  
Pictures from the Korean Textbook’s Post-War Economic Growth Section 
Left: American consultants observing a textile worker. Right: Famous business mogul YC Wang inspecting a 
factory. The accompanying caption highlights his achievements in many industries. These images seem to present 
a paternalistic relationship between American aid and business people and the normal people in Taiwan.   
Pictures from the Taiwanese Textbook’s Post-War Economic Growth Section 
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more distant. The Taiwanese images also seem to present a view of economics from above, an 
approach that is driven home by the last sentence of the chapter on economic growth (emphasis 
added):  
Taiwan’s economic growth needs the wisdom and efforts of the government and 
enterprises. Only with them, can Taiwan’s economy be sustainably managed and 
flourish. (p. 207)  
 
Thus, liberal textbooks show average people in the context of economic forces beyond 
their control. However, their approach differs in that the Taiwanese textbook mentions 
commoners in relation to macroeconomic policies whereas the Korean textbook, most likely 
motivated by minjung ideology, takes a greater interest in their plight. 
 
4. Foreign aid 
Any discussion of postwar economic development in South Korea and Taiwan would be 
incomplete without mentioning the role of foreign aid. To Korea, “the United States alone 
supplied $12.6 billion in economic and military assistance between 1946 and 1976,” a magnitude 
of aid exceeded only by South Vietnam and Israel.59 Taiwan received $4.1 billion in U.S. aid 
from 1949 to 1967, making it one of the largest aid recipients for a non-combat zone country.60 
                                                          
59 Edward S. Mason, The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1980), 165. Korea also received aid from other sources, but 95% of aid in the decade after the 
Korean War was from the United States (Mason, 189). 
60 See Ho, 110-111. 
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Aid of course came with strings attached; it gave the U.S. leverage over its two Free World 
allies—leverage that they did not always welcome.61  
From an economic standpoint, however, aid was highly valuable. While military aid 
relieved the burden of remarkably high military expenditures in both countries, economic aid 
relaxed important constraints on economic growth. In the aftermath of the Second World War 
and the two countries’ civil wars, the dearth of domestic savings and foreign exchange reserves 
limited the countries’ abilities to invest in their economies and import materials needed for 
production. In the 1950s, grant aid respectively financed 70% and 40% of Korea and Taiwan’s 
imports while foreign savings—almost entirely U.S. aid—financed 80% and 40% of gross 
domestic capital formation in Korea and Taiwan.62 U.S. aid thus served as what economists 
would call a “gap filler” before exports took off in the mid-1960s and 1970s. Finally, U.S. aid 
meant that by the 1960s when both countries’ economies were ready for export-promotion, they 
had very little debt.63 This meant that, unlike many developing countries, their economies would 
not be burdened by the repayment of debt; they could simply take off. 
It would seem that emphasizing foreign aid would be an ideal way to challenge the statist 
(and in Korea’s case corporatist) narrative of economic development. This is true in the 
Taiwanese case, but not of the Korean one. Once again, the Taiwanese textbook focuses on the 
                                                          
61 It should be noted that influence was not one-directional. As Mason writes, “as in so many recorded instances of 
USAID relationships, it was the weaker power that held the whip hand” (15). American fears of what South Korea 
might do if U.S. aid decreased actually gave the aid recipient the upper hand at the negotiating table sometimes. It 
seems that American engagement was received with less resistance in Taiwan. Jacoby writes that the loss of the 
Chinese mainland, the “face” of the ROC, made the Chinese more “responsive to the economic counsels of the 
U.S.—partly because they realized they could not afford to fail again” (116).  
62 Mason 188-189. Ho, 114-15. 
63 In Taiwan, around 82.5% of aid was delivered as grants and in Korea, aid was exclusively grant until 1963. Even 
loans tended to be “soft” loans, which meant that they charged a below-market rate of interest. In Korea aid 




effects of foreign aid on the government and the economy, whereas the Korean textbook draws 
attention to their social consequences. For instance, the Korean textbook says that “the U.S. 
began providing Korea with relief after Restoration and further expanded aid to the country after 
the Korean War, helping to ease social anxiety.” It is noteworthy that the textbook authors 
deemed an easing of “social anxiety” (사회 불안, sahoe buran) the most important effect of the 
relief. In contrast, the Taiwanese textbook highlights the effects on the economy: “After the 
Korean War erupted in 1951, the U.S. restored economic aid to Taiwan. This aid became the 
most important external factor in stabilizing the economy at that time.” While we can assume 
that a stabilized economy lessened social anxiety, it is noteworthy that the Korean textbook 
emphasizes the effects on society over those on the economy. 
The difference in focus is also clear from the types of early American aid listed. The 
Korean textbook focuses on consumer necessities: “Relief materials [after the Korean War] 
mainly took the form of consumer goods, mostly food products, as well as raw materials for 
consumer goods industries such as cotton, sugar, and flour.” On the other hand, the Taiwanese 
textbook provides a fuller list of aid, only a part of which hint at how American aid might have 
impacted the average person:  
American aid included surplus agricultural products, material imports, and loans, 
which helped Taiwan alleviate its shortage of daily necessities, stabilizing inflation 
and supplying raw materials necessary for industrial development. At a time when 
the government was short on finances and struggling to reconstruct facilities 
damaged during the war, the U.S. also provided much-needed assistance in 
repairing and rebuilding infrastructure involving electricity, transportation and 
shipping, and irrigation (p. 195). 
The difference in the two portrayals of aid cannot merely be attributed to differences in the 
nature of U.S. aid to its two allies, since U.S. aid provided much assistance beyond supplying 
consumer goods and raw materials for the production thereof. The liberal Korean textbook’s 
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emphasis on such goods is therefore most likely a result of its minjung focus on the “common 
people.” 
However, minjung concerns for the common people cannot explain the other 
discrepancies between the liberal Korean textbook’s narrative and those of scholars, as the 
passage below demonstrates:  
The Syngman Rhee administration also imported American surplus 
agricultural goods, which it sold off to the public to form a counterpart 
fund. This fund was in turn used to finance the national treasury and 
political funds. Surplus agricultural goods played a big role in alleviating 
food shortages, but they also depressed prices of locally-produced 
agricultural products, decreasing the incomes of farmers (p. 397). 
Like its Taiwanese counterpart, the Korean textbook discusses the effects of American food aid 
on the government (“national treasury and political funds”) and mentions that food aid alleviated 
food shortages. However, unlike its Taiwanese counterpart, it points out a negative consequence 
of the aid: the decrease in farmers’ incomes. While the decision to mention both the pros and 
cons of American aid make it seem more balanced, it is actually unfair to hold American aid 
solely responsible for the plummet in farming incomes, as it was the policy of the Rhee 
administration to depress rice prices to control inflation.64 American food aid merely abetted a 
policy that was already in place. The portrayal of American aid as the one cause of agricultural 
misfortune is therefore misguided, raising the question of whether the textbook authors were 
intentionally misrepresenting American aid instead of simply abiding to its focus on the lives of 
the minjung.  
 Further analysis of the half-chapter reveals that this misleading depiction of U.S. aid is 
most likely the result of anti-American sentiment. For instance, the textbook does not mention 
                                                          
64 Mason, 11.  
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the many ways in which the U.S. assistance contributed to the livelihoods of normal people. 
After all, the three main goals of the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) 
were to prevent starvation, disease, and unrest, which it had sufficiently achieved by 1948.65 The 
USAMGIK also made impressive strides in the realm of public education and land reforms in the 
1950s, in addition to contributing to increased agricultural and industrial output.66 Further, after 
the Korean War, U.S. aid financed much of the country’s reconstruction and stabilization 
efforts.67 Clearly, U.S. aid had much more positive effects on normal people’s lives than the 
textbook is willing to admit.  
The textbook’s neglect of the positive consequences of American assistance is perhaps 
most evident in that it ends the section on American economic aid, “Economic Conditions in the 
1950s and American Economic Aid,” on an entirely negative note (emphasis added): 
The continued slowdown of the American economy in the late 1950s led 
the U.S. to gradually scale down aid to Korea. What the U.S. previously 
provided free of charge, it now provided on loans or at a fee. The 
shrinking of U.S. aid immediately precipitated an economic downturn in 
Korea (p. 397). 
The assertion that cuts in U.S. grant aid helped weaken the Korean economy is true, but is hardly 
the only consequence of this change in aid policy. As previously discussed, generous grant aid 
prior to this point had left Korea basically debt-free.68 Equipped with this positive “credit score,” 
Korea could easily borrow money from foreign countries. The effects of the reductions in grant 
aid were thus not as dire as the passage makes them seem. In addition, the decrease of grant aid 
                                                          
65 The American decision to not focus on industrialization was also motivated by concerns that the South would 
unite with the North.  
66 Attendance in primary and secondary schools doubled and tripled during the USAMGIK period, and land reforms 
redistributed more than 96% of land formerly owned by the Japanese (Mason, 169-171). 
67 Mason, 93. 
68 Mason, 14. 
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to Korea had the effect of weening the country off aid-dependent import substitution policies and 
pushing it towards more independent export-oriented ones.69 In fact, this is precisely the point 
that the conservative textbook makes with regards to the reduction of U.S. aid: “After 1959, 
grant aid decreased, and aid continued in the form of loans. The Republic of Korea now needed 
plans for economic independence” (Kyohaksa, p. 332). In sum, the liberal Korean textbook 
blames U.S. aid policy for depressing agricultural incomes and for precipitating an economic 
downturn, while largely neglecting the myriad ways in which U.S. aid helped the country 
recover from war.  
Like their discussions of foreign aid in economic recovery, the textbooks’ discussions of 
foreign aid in economic development also reveal different attitudes. Whereas the Korean 
textbook does not mention how foreign aid contributed to economic development at all, the 
Taiwanese textbook mentions multiple times how U.S. economic aid helped Taiwanese 
industries.70 All the passages below from the Taiwanese textbook mention aid (emphasized in 
italics), even just in passing:  
With American aid, infrastructure left over from the Japanese colonial era, and 
skilled personnel who came to Taiwan after the war, the government actively 
promoted industrial import substitution, in hopes of replacing imported products 
with domestically produced ones in order to reduce reliance on foreign 
countries.... On the one hand the government fostered domestic industry, 
subsidized raw materials, and utilized American material and foreign exchange 
aid, helping industry players to import raw materials and facilities. On the other 
hand, the government employed measures such as high tariffs and import 
restrictions to protect the domestic market, promoting domestic industrial 
progress…. The most important industries that achieved import substitution were 
the textile and concrete industries. In the case of the prioritized textiles industry, 
the government used an advantageous exchange rate to supply factories with 
cheap American cotton from the aid program, lowering production costs (195-96). 
                                                          
69 Mason writes that “prior to 1960, the Korean government had undertaken no borrowing abroad, except for a 
small amount from the Development Loan Fund” (200). 
70 The liberal Korean textbook mentions foreign loans and investment, but does not specify what is aid.  
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From the passages above, readers get the sense that without “American aid,” the Taiwanese 
government would not have been able to promote its policy of import substitution as 
effectively—that without access to “American material and foreign exchange aid,” industries 
would have had a more difficult time developing, and without “American cotton,” the textile 
industry, a main industry at the time, would not have developed so smoothly. Clearly, the 
textbook authors wanted to drive home the link between American economic aid and the 
successful development of industry in Taiwan in the 1950s. This emphasis is most likely the 
result of Taiwanese nationalist historiography, which highlights the various non-Chinese 
influences on Taiwan’s development. 
It is thus clear that the Taiwanese textbook mentions foreign aid more frequently and also 
portrays it in a far more positive light than its Korean counterpart. While the liberal Korean 
textbook’s aversion for the state and big corporations could be understood in terms of minjung 
historiography, this analysis of foreign aid showed the need to also see the Korean textbook’s 
attitude in light of left-nationalism, or the leftists’ response to rightist or bourgeois nationalism. 
As Korean leftists, they were most likely reluctant to credit American aid, because they viewed 
the Americans as being in collusion with Korean dictatorships to oppress the “people.” On the 
other hand, Taiwanese liberals enthusiastically appropriated foreign aid to challenge statist 
explanations of Taiwan’s economic growth and Sino-centric narratives of Taiwanese history.  
 
5. Foreign Trade 
After World War II, both countries traded extensively with the U.S. and Japan. As resource-poor 
countries with small markets, Korea and Taiwan relied heavily on foreign trade to acquire raw 
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materials, capital goods, and access to consumers.71 It is, therefore, no surprise that, in both 
countries, the share of foreign trade to GNP ballooned alongside their economic miracles, albeit 
alongside an increasing reliance on foreign trade.72, 73 Suffice it to say that the economic miracles 
in Taiwan and South Korea did not unfold in a vacuum.  
 Once again, we would expect both liberal textbooks to use foreign trade to challenge 
conservative state-centric narratives of economic growth. However, just as in the case of foreign 
aid, there is a need to consider another aspect of liberalism: nationalism. That the Taiwanese 
textbook waxes lyrical on trade with the U.S. and Japan is therefore less an indication that liberal 
Taiwanese are free market advocates as an indication of their desire to distance Taiwan from 
China. That the Korean textbook characterizes trade with U.S. and Japan as over-dependence 
must also be seen in light of the liberal nationalists’ negative experiences with the two countries.  
At first, it would seem that the Taiwanese textbook portrays foreign trade positively, 
reflecting liberals’ desire to challenge conservative narratives of economic growth. The 
Taiwanese textbook’s first mention of trade occurs in the context of economic recovery: “In 
1950, rice and sugar exports to mostly Japan brought in around $100 million USD of foreign 
exchange” (p. 195). This sentence highlights how trade with Japan contributed to economic 
recovery. The textbook’s second mention of trade occurs in the context of economic growth:  
While Taiwan received American aid, the U.S. was its largest source of imports 
and Japan its largest destination for exports. As Taiwanese exports gradually 
transitioned from processed agricultural goods to industrial products, the nature of 
this trade triangle changed…. Taiwan experienced a trade surplus with the U.S. 
and deficit with Japan. By the mid-1960s, the U.S. became Taiwan’s largest 
                                                          
71 Mason, 125. Ho, 133. 
72 Mason, 133. The share of gross exports in GNP from the early 1960s to the mid-1970s grew from 2% to 30%. 
73 Ho, 133. In Taiwan, between the early 1950s and early 1970s, the ratio of foreign trade (exports plus imports) to 
GNP increased from 23% to 83%. 
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export destination, and Japan its second. On the other hand, Japan became 
Taiwan’s largest source of imports and the U.S. its second (p. 198). 
While not as affirmative as the first mention of trade, this passage strongly emphasizes the 
degree to which Taiwan traded with the U.S. and Japan. A diagram illustrating the country’s 
changing trade relations is included, underscoring the importance of foreign trade in the section 
on economic growth. Taken together, the two passages seem to be motivated by a desire to 
challenge conservative state-centric narratives.  
Analysis of how the textbook discusses trade with China, however, shows that this is not 
the only motivation liberal Taiwanese have. The textbook’s positive treatment of trade with the 
U.S. and Japan may actually be a move to distance Taiwan from conservative Sinocentric views 
of Taiwan’s history. In fact, Taiwanese liberals see economic hegemony from China as a serious 
threat to the country’s sovereignty and liberal politicians in Taiwan today stress the importance 
of diversifying Taiwan’s trade relations, code for “decreasing the country’s reliance on China.”74 
Therefore, the only way to determine whether or not the Taiwanese textbook authors also share 
their Korean equivalents’ ambivalence towards trade is to see how trade with China is portrayed. 
It turns out that there is indeed evidence that the textbook authors are concerned with over-
reliance on China. In the following chapter on economic growth after the Taiwan Miracle, the 
section, “Trade with China,” concludes with the assertion, “it is worth paying attention to the 
pros and cons of promoting cross-strait economic liberalization” (204). While not explicitly 
characterizing trade with China as a threat, this statement points out that there are cons of trade 
with China, unlike the rest of the chapter on economic growth that discusses only the pros of 
trade with the U.S. and Japan. This difference subtly hints at the liberal textbook authors’ 
                                                          
74 This is a valid concern, given that it has been China’s recent policy to woo Taiwan with economic incentives.  
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ambivalence towards Chinese economic hegemony. Thus liberal Taiwanese textbook authors 
portray trade with the U.S. and Japan positively is more a reflection of their desire to challenge 
Sino-centric narratives of Taiwanese history than a desire to downplay the role of the state.  
The liberal Korean textbook on the other hand paints a negative portrait of trade with the 
U.S. and Japan; it mentions trade once, and emphasizes its effect of making Korea dependent on 
these hegemons (emphasis added): 
Further, because policies focused more on expanding exports than on generating 
domestic demand, Korea became over dependent on the outside world, especially 
the U.S. and Japan (p. 399). 
To understand this view of foreign trade, it is necessary to understand how the rhetoric of 
self-reliance is used in Korean politics. Simply put, it is not merely a phenomenon on the 
left, as can be seen from this quote from Park Chung-hee (emphasis added): 
Economic resurgence is an integral part of a nationalistic vision of a more 
independent Korea to come—more independent of the United States aid and 
control and, as an economically stronger and independent entity, more able to 
deal with North Korea.75 
The link between economic strength and political independence cannot be clearer. Conservatives 
today also use the rhetoric of economic independence to justify neo-liberal economic policies. 
For instance, “pro-business think tanks and lobby groups for national or transnational 
corporations, argue that ‘the race to free trade agreements’ is both inevitable and irreversible,” 
contending that Korea needs to open up to trade liberalization in order to remain competitive and 
independent.76  
                                                          
75 Park Chung Hee (1963), The Country, the Revolution and I: 19-20. Quoted in Mason et al. 1980: 46. 
76 Mi Park, “Framing Free Trade Agreements: The Politics of Nationalism in the Anti-Neoliberal Globalization 
Movement in South Korea,” Globalizations December 2009, Vol. 6, No. 4: 452. 
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It is thus clear that both conservatives and liberals agree on the need for self-reliance. 
This agreement stems from Korean nationalism, which “during the modernisation period became 
a powerful unifying ideology regardless of whether one was allied with the North or South, 
conservative or progressive, or the rulers or the ruled.”77 The difference between left-nationalism 
and right-nationalism lies in their political concerns. As opposed to their conservative 
counterparts who emphasized national unity against North Korea at the expense of political 
liberties, liberals stressed the primacy of the minjung or the common people against 
encroachments from the authoritarian regime and business elite.  
But how does minjung ideology lead to an insistence on economic sovereignty? The 
answer to this question lies in both the historic roots of the ideology and in its modern-day 
implications. After 1979, Korean liberals began to see the liberation of their country from foreign 
hegemony as a prerequisite to achieving democratization and unification. Liberals’ faith in U.S. 
as a beacon of democracy and human rights was shattered when American troops were rumored 
to have deployed military units to help quash the Gwangju Uprising in 1980.78 Their suspicions 
seemed to be confirmed when Ronald Reagan invited to the White House President Chun Doo-
hwan, the general who had seized power in 1979 and was ultimately responsible for the bloody 
crackdown in Gwangju City. By the mid-1980s, the majority of liberals were convinced that the 
U.S. was behind the authoritarian regime itself, and student activists launched protests at local 
                                                          
77 Jae-won Joo, “Conceptualising Korean Nationalism,” Journal of Korean Culture 26, 2014.5, 309. 
78 The rise of anti-American sentiment in Korea was especially surprising seeing as Koreans had, in general, 
harbored feelings of amity towards the U.S., which they thanked for defending them in the Korean War and for 
providing generous economic aid. 
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American government offices, going so far as to commit arson in broad daylight.79 As a result of 
this sense of betrayal, Korean liberals developed a distaste for foreign intervention in their 
country’s economy.80  
An irony of the minjung movement today is that although activists join hands with groups 
around the world to oppose neo-liberal economic policies, they appropriate nationalist rhetoric in 
doing so. For instance, anti-FTA groups in Korea “framed the [Korea-US] FTA not in terms of 
conflicting class interests between capital and labor but in terms of conflicting national interests 
between the US and South Korea.” One activist even declared that the day of the signing of the 
FTA was “the second most shameful day after the day of Japan’s annexation of Korea” 81  The 
KORUS-FTA, critics contended, would lead to the loss of Korean economic sovereignty, which 
would then lead to a host of social problems, such as the loss of livelihood of Korean farmers 
who would not be able to compete with American agribusiness. National sovereignty, as opposed 
to proletarian revolution, thus became the rallying cry.82 Therefore, the liberal Korean textbook’s 
insistence that trade equals over-reliance must be understood in the need of minjung liberalism to 
counter foreign economic hegemony.  
                                                          
79 It did not help that top U.S. officials in South Korea also reportedly said South Korea was “not ready for 
democracy” and called the student protesters “spoiled brats.” While the verity of the second statement is 
questionable, both statements became widely circulated among dissident groups. For more information on the 
arson and these statements, see Henry Scott Stokes, “Anti-US Sentiment is Seen in Korea,” New York Times, March 
28, 1982, accessed March 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/03/28/world/anti-us-sentiment-is-seen-in-
korea.html. 
80 It should be noted that nationalist historians were already not fans of colonial modernism theory, and had 
already been searching for ways to disprove the notion that Japan modernized Korea by showing that there were 
already signs of modernity during the late Joseon period. Betrayal by the U.S. simply added to Korean historians’ 
arguments that foreign powers obstructed Korean development. See Min, 18-22. 
81 Mi Park, 459. 
82 Anti-neoliberalism and anti-FTA groups and minjung activists are not always the same, but for there is a lot of 
overlap. As Mi Park writes, “the key organizational forces that make up the anti-FTA coalition greatly overlap with 
the major actors that are the driving force behind the anti-[neoliberal] globalization movement in South Korea” 
(Park 2009).  
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In sum, the Taiwanese textbook takes a more positive approach to discussing trade with 
the U.S. and Japan whereas the Korean textbook dwells on its negative ramifications: over-
reliance on those two countries. The different approaches taken reflect liberals’ desires to 
distance their country from those they have had negative experiences with. In the case of 
Taiwan, that is China and in the case of Korean, that is the U.S. and Japan.  
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this study was to shed light on how liberals in South Korea and Taiwan compare 
and contrast in their understandings of their countries’ economic miracles. The preceding 
analysis has shown that liberals in the two countries, influenced by their political beliefs, indeed 
have different understandings of this past.  
 The liberal Korean textbook’s views reflect the legacy of liberal Korean historiography, 
whereas those of the liberal Taiwanese textbook reflect the influence of liberal Taiwanese 
historiography. The Korean textbook’s more assertive tone and its open criticism of the state and 
the chaebol echoes the desire of minjung scholars in the 1980s to liberate the people from an 
oppressive government-big business complex. The Taiwanese textbook’s more diplomatic tone 
and its appropriation of achievements of private enterprise, foreign aid, and trade to indirectly 
challenge that of the state, on the other hand, harken back to the conciliation practiced by liberal 
reformers in the 1990s, when the tide had already turned in their favor.83 In addition, the primacy 
of the minjung in liberal movements in Korea has meant that the textbook pays attention to the 
plight of the bottom rungs of society, whereas the Taiwanese textbook has a more paternalistic 
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approach, focusing on the agency of government and business leaders. In addition, liberal 
Korean suspicions of foreign aid and trade have roots in their difficult past with the U.S., where 
as Taiwanese liberals’ enthusiasm for foreign aid and trade are motivated by their desire to 
extract Taiwan from conservative Sino-centric narratives. Therefore, the differences in the two 
liberal textbooks reflect the two countries’ different histories of liberalism. 
 A final point that deserves to be made is that while neither textbook explicitly asks 
readers to contemplate different perspectives on history, it seems that the liberal Taiwanese 
history textbook points in this direction. Rather than asserting that theirs is the “correct view of 
history” as their Korean counterparts do, the Taiwanese textbook authors acknowledge that 
different perspectives exist and can be equally valid. It remains to be seen whether this attitude 
towards historical pedagogy will change as conservatives in Taiwan lose ground, or if in Korea, 
a younger generation of historians will be able to bring more dispassionate perspectives to their 
country’s history textbooks.  
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This project began with a dialogue I came across in a Korean language textbook. Thanks 
to the generosity of the Light Fellowship, I had the opportunity to study Korean in Seoul from 
2014 to 2015 at the Korean Language Center of Korea University. In my third term, I took Level 
6, which focused on training students to speak formally about a wide array of topics from 
educational policy to the unification of the Two Koreas. In one of the chapters, titled 
“Industrialization and Democratization,” the opening dialogue featured a Korean teacher and his 
students, presumably Americans, discussing the shipbuilding industry. The shipbuilding sector in 
South Korea has been central to the country’s economy since the 1970s. 
 The dialogue is based in Busan, where much of the industry is located. A student 
expresses amazement at Korean ships. His teacher responds by crediting former President Park 
Chung-hee and his economic policies for supporting the development of such industries that 
spurred on the country’s economic growth. The student then expresses his admiration for the 
Korean government, which prompts his teacher to remind him that it was ultimately the “Korean 
people who came together to rebuild their country.”  
 The reference to the unity of the Korean people did not surprise me. There had been a 
unit earlier in the textbook on Korean culture that stressed unity and cohesion as a key aspect of 
Korean society. The nod to the Park regime should have been surprising, given that my young 
Korean friends had often stressed that he was a dictator and accused his daughter, current 
president Park Geun-hye, of being the same. However, I reasoned that even Koreans who do not 
remember Park fondly, concede that he contributed to Korea’s economic growth. Further, 
foreign language textbooks often simplify the cultures and countries from which they originate to 
convey more important things like grammar, vocabulary, and sentence structure.  
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So there is no reason to be surprised that this dialogue oversimplifies the realities of 
Korea’s economic growth. However, I was surprised by the lack of mention of foreign 
assistance, which from my understanding played a big role in Korea’s post-war economic 
growth. While it is essential to have a government that prioritizes economic development, it is 
highly unlikely that one of the poorest countries in the world after the Korean War could become 
a G20 member in just half a century without assistance or involvement from developed 
countries.  
Was the author’s omission of foreign aid indicative of a larger gap in collective memory? 
It made me wonder how foreign aid is portrayed to Korean students in their history classes. I had 
read an online review of Daniel C. Sneider and Gi-Wook Shin’s History Textbooks and the Wars 
in Asia, a compilation of papers about how the wars in East Asia are portrayed in history 
textbooks across the region. There is a piece that compares Korean and Taiwanese textbooks’ 
portrayals of Japanese colonization, which sparked my interest in conducting a similar study of 
their portrayals’ of post-war economic growth. Both countries received massive amounts of aid 
and investment during the Cold War. Do the textbooks mention the role of such external factors 
played in their country’s respective success? Or do they portray the economic miracles portrayed 
solely as fruits of the nation’s labor?  
My hypothesis was that because Korean nationalism is largely ethnic in nature, Korean 
textbooks would omit discussions of foreign assistance. On the other hand, Taiwanese 
nationalism, which defines itself in contrast to an ethnic Chinese nationalism, and therefore 
embraces diversity as a central tenet, would speak highly of the foreign assistance.  
To study this hypothesis, I originally purchased two history textbooks from each country 
that are used in mandatory high school history classes. What I soon realized, however, was that 
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the Taiwanese textbook I had purchased was a more conservative one whereas the Korean one I 
had was more liberal-leaning. This made me realize that I could not simply draw conclusions on 
Taiwanese or Korean nationalism from two textbooks alone, so I asked friends and family who 
visited Taiwan and Korea purchase a more liberal Taiwanese textbook and a more conservative 
Korean textbook for me. (They kindly obliged!) Over the course of my research, I also 
discovered how divided each society was regarding the textbook controversies, and by extension, 
the past. In addition, in Professor Steven Pincus’ class on the British Empire, I learned about the 
need to understand the Empire through political divisions within England. This lesson helped 
lead me to realize the need to understand Taiwan and South Korea through the lens of political 
factions instead of merely focusing on nationalism. I decided to shift my focus to exploring how 
liberals view the past. 
As I honed the subject of my study down to liberals, however, I realized I needed to 
expand the scope of my study to analyze depictions of post-war economic growth in general. I 
had noticed interesting differences in the two textbooks besides portrayals of foreign aid, trade, 
and investment. For instance, the Taiwanese textbook emphasized more the relationship of 
foreign aid to government policy and industry, whereas its Korean counterpart highlighted the 
experiences of “common people.” These different historiographical approaches manifested 
themselves in many ways in the same chapters, making me realize that I could not do justice to 
the differences in the textbooks by focusing narrowly on foreign influences on the economy. 
Thus, in order to better illustrate the different approaches the textbooks’ authors took to history, I 
decided to expand my thesis to include how each textbook depicts the following ingredients of 
economic growth: the state, private enterprise, the people, foreign aid, and foreign trade. I also 
added a section discussing the pedagogical motives of the textbooks as ascertained from the 
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forewords and activities incorporated into the chapters. I would have liked to also discuss how 
the agricultural sector, foreign investment, and foreign events (such as the Vietnam War) are 
portrayed, but my analyses of these factors did not yield any insights not covered in by my 
discussions of other factors. 
Having thus decided on the focus of my study, I began the process of research. In the fall 
semester, I concentrated my efforts on understanding history education in the two countries, 
including past controversies surrounding the textbooks and current textbook approval processes. 
History education in any country is bound to raise someone’s eyebrows, but this seems to be 
especially the case in Taiwan and South Korea, most likely because their recent democratization 
has generated public and academic interest in reevaluating the past. There was thus a wealth of 
secondary sources to work from. A comparative study naturally lends itself to heavy use of 
secondary material, so I cannot describe all of them here, but I will note the ones that aided my 
understanding of the two countries’ history education the most. Alisa Jones’ “Toward Pluralism? 
The Politics of History Textbooks in South Korea, Taiwan, and China” tracks the history of 
curricular changes in South Korea and Taiwan to broader shifts in pedagogical concerns, 
tempering my belief that political ideology was the sole source of education reforms. Michael 
Hsiao’s “One colonialism, two memories: Representing Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and 
South Korea,” helped me understand differences in textbook portrayals of another period of 
history.  
In the spring semester, I focused my attention on analyzing the contents of the textbook 
themselves. I therefore had to study the two countries’ post-war economic trajectories. For this, I 
consulted Zhiqun Zhu’s primer on East Asian post-war economies, Understanding East Asia’s 
Economic “Miracles,” as well as two “textbooks” of the countries’ economic histories: Samuel 
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PS Ho’s Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860-1970 and Edward Mason’s The Economic and 
Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea. As the two countries’ post-war situations shared 
many parallels, I also had other comparative studies at my disposal, including Karl Field’s 
Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan.  
However, while learning about economic history allowed me to see where the textbooks 
diverged from scholarly sources, it did not help me understand why that was. I then turned to Gi-
Wook Shin’s Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, which discusses the history of Korean nationalism. 
From this book, I learned about the minjung movement, which aimed to empower the “common 
people,” defined as the urban poor, laborers, and farmers. I realized that the Korean textbook 
focused on exactly these people much more than its Taiwanese counterpart did and that the 
existence of minjung ideology is probably the reason why.  
Learning about the minjung movement thus helped me put in context not only the 
textbook contents, but also my understandings of Korean politics: previously, I had noticed that 
labor groups in Korea played a far larger role in anti-government protests than those in Taiwan. I 
was closer to understanding why. From further research, I noticed many other similarities 
between the textbook and minjung historiography. For instance, from Hyonku Min’s “Trends in 
the Study of Modern Korean History, 1945-2000,” I learned that the minjung academics, many 
of whom participated in democratization movements, believed that their predecessors—the 
nationalist scholars—focused too much on the past and advocated a more activist approach to 
history. From Namhee Lee’s Making of Minjung : Democracy and the Politics of Representation 
in South Korea, I learned how intellectuals had joined hands with factory workers in their 
struggle for democracy. These new understandings helped me contextualize the views and the 
more opinionated nature of the liberal Korean textbook.  
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This made me realize how wrong I was initially to characterize the dialogue in the 
Korean language textbook as “nationalistic.” Email exchanges with Professor Owen Miller at 
SOAS helped me understand that Korean nationalism can be roughly divided into “left-
nationalism,” which is sympathetic to North Korea and the lower socioeconomic classes, and 
“right nationalism,” which demonizes the North and focuses on the bourgeois. Thus, I realized 
that the specific kind of nationalism exhibited in the Korea University language textbook was 
more of the bourgeois nationalism advocated by Park Chung-hee, in which the working class 
was demanded to subordinate their interests to those of the nation.  
Although the conclusions I draw are probably not surprising to experts on Taiwan and 
Korea, this was my first time embarking on a study of these two countries in depth. I had few 
opportunities to systematically learn about their histories during my time at Yale, since we do not 
have courses specifically dedicated to them. However, more in-depth exploration of the countries 
came only when I chose to write about them in the context of other courses, ranging from the 
history of Western medicine to East Asian food history. My senior project therefore became a 
directed study in the two countries’ recent histories, and the discoveries I made had huge 
significance for my personal interest in Taiwan and South Korea. It has also made me realize 
what scholarship the field still lacks; for instance, while there are tentative conclusions on why 
views of the Japanese colonial periods vary so much between the two countries, there is 
surprisingly no comprehensive study on how these views developed. I am not sure if I will ever 
pursue graduate studies in history, but if I do, this topic is definitely something I would want to 
work on.  
 In conclusion, I would like to thank many people for help with my project. Firstly, it has 
been very helpful to bounce ideas off of my advisor, Peter Perdue, who has a wealth of 
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knowledge about the history of East Asia in general. For more country-specific knowledge, I 
reached out to friends and professors around the world. I owe Michael Turton, a frequent 
commentator on Taiwanese politics and history, many beers for his help; he not only pointed me 
to crucial secondary literature on Taiwan’s post-war developments, but has also patiently 
answered my many questions on this subject. For knowledge on Korea, I reached out to Sunwoo 
Ryu, a former Yale student now pursuing medical studies at Korea University. When I got stuck, 
he kindly pointed me in the right direction. Professor Namhee Lee at UCLA graciously sent me 
an unpublished paper to give me insights on popular memory of the 1980s. Professor Owen 
Miller at SOAS kindly answered sent me a paper of his on Korean historiography and answered 
my questions on the subject. Finally, I must thank my friends and family for mentally supporting 
me through this process.  
 
